The Northern Kyushu Torrential Rain in July 2012 killed 31 people and destroyed more than 2,100 houses. The maximum rainfall per hour and per 24 hours were recorded at 108 mm and 507.5 mm, respectively. It also caused extensive damage to the Tatsuta area in Kumamoto City. Some residents stayed at home in the flooded area and were rescued by boats or helicopters because an evacuation order was delayed by the local government. On the other hand, many residents evacuated in time. We surveyed this evacuation behavior, awareness of disaster prevention, and the social capital, etc. Next, we analyzed the factors in promoting evacuation on the flood and made the evacuation behavior model. As a result, it was indicated that the factors in promoting evacuation on the flood were to check the river conditions and to be advised to evacuate by their neighbors. Furthermore, it was made clear that social capital in the community affected the practical ability of disaster prevention activities.
INTRODUCTION
It rained hard in the Kumamoto and Aso areas of Kumamoto Prefecture and the western part of Oita Prefecture, Japan, for several hours from midnight to morning on July 12, 2012. Eight weather observatories recorded a historical high. The maximum rainfall per hour and per 24 hours were recorded at 108 mm and 507.5 mm at the AsoOtohime observation, respectively. This rain was named the "Northern Kyushu Torrential Rain in July 2012" by the meteorological agency. The flood and the landslide caused by this torrential rain killed 31 people and hurt 11 people. There were 1,175 houses flooded above the floor level and 1,019 houses flooded below the floor level in the Kyushu area. There were 363 houses totally destroyed, 1,500 houses seriously damaged, and 313 houses partially damaged.
The Shirakawa River rose in a short time and flooded in Kumamoto City on July 12, 2012. The Shirakawa River runs from the Aso area to Kumamoto city and is a Class A river. Its length is 74 km. The households living in the basin of the Shirakawa River in Kumamoto City were ordered to evacuate at 9:20 A.M. by the local government. However, Tatsuta areas were already flooded at that time. Then, some households stayed at their home in the flooding area and were rescued by boats or helicopters. It was indicated that the evacuation order had been delayed. But it was difficult to judge an evacuation order at the same time that the local government was making sure of the dangerous area appropriately, because this torrential rain would cause serious damage widely. With this torrential rain, the need for autonomous evacuation by households themselves was made clear anew.
Regarding the relation between a provider of evacuation information and awareness of evacuation, Asada, Katada, Okajima, & Kobatake (2001) indicate that people prefer sufficient time to evacuate to a fault of evacuation information. They also mention that the information from a public agency rather than the information from their family or their neighbors raises people's sense of reality of disaster. On the other hand, Okumura, Tsukai, & Shimoaraiso (2001) indicate a possibility that a fault of an evacuation order causes "the effect of a person crying wolf." Katada, Kodama, Asada, Oikawa, & Arahata (2002) indicate that just after recommending evacuation, it affected evacuation behavior whether or not people listened to an evacuation recommendation and checked the river conditions. They also indicate that the structure of a house and dangerousness of the evacuation route affected evacuation behavior after flooding.
It is said that not only an individual but also a local community play a major role in awareness and behavior of disaster prevention. Matsumoto and Yabeta (2008) indicate that the person aggressively participating in common activities in a local community shows a strong tendency to continue the activities of disaster prevention. Haruyama and Mizuno (2007) indicate that the ordinary common activities in a local community promote active support during a disaster. Fujimi, Kakimoto, Yamada, Matsuo, & Yamamoto (2011) indicate that the social capital of a local community relate to awareness of disaster prevention in a local community.
In this study, we analyze factors of promoting autonomous evacuation on the basis of a questionnaire survey about evacuation behavior during the flood on July 12, 2012. The above research analyzed decision-making and evacuation behavior under real or imaginary evacuation orders provided by the local government, whereas the chief distinction of this study is to focus on actual decision making and autonomous evacuation behavior on the flood when evacuation orders were delayed by the local government. The past research was limited to the analysis of relations between a local community and activities of disaster prevention on a normal day. On the other hand, this study analyzes whether households' participation level of common activities in a local community affected their evacuation behavior during a real disaster. This study also analyzes whether the difference of ordinary activities between the two local communities impacted the difference of their evacuation behavior during the real disaster. Therefore, the place of this study is a demonstrative study of the past research.
AN OUTLINE OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY
The study areas of the questionnaire survey about evacuation behavior were Tatsuda-1chome and Tatsudajinnai-4chome in Kumamoto City. Both areas are located at a meandering point of the Shirakawa River and are low-lying areas. Both areas used to be an urbanization control area and agricultural land. Since the areas were designated as an urbanization area in 1971, many houses were rapidly built there. A hazard map of the study areas is shown in Figure  1 . It was forecasted that most of both areas would be flooded, and the actual flooded areas mostly corresponded with them. Both areas were flooded in 1980 and 1990, and the simplified levees were raised 2 m after the 1990 flood.
By a fact-finding survey in the study areas on the flood, the submerged roads were partly confirmed at a few minutes after 6:00 A.M., and the inundation started in the lower near the Shirakawa River at approximately 8:00 A.M. The present capacity of the Shirakawa River around the study areas is 1,500 m 3 /s, whereas it was estimated that flood waters on July 12, 2012 ran more than 2,300m 3 /s. A lot of residents in Tatsuda-4chome failed to escape because of a muddy stream, and 82 people were rescued by helicopters or boats from the Japan SelfDefense Force, the police, and the fire station. We did the questionnaire survey about awareness of evacuation and evacuation behavior on the flood in cooperation with Kumamoto City Hall on December 8-9, 2012. There were 610 households living in the study areas on the flood. Of these, 211 houses were totally or seriously destroyed, and 309 houses were flooded above or below the floor level. Since most of houses in study area had some damage, all of the households had to escape on that day. Seventeen investigators visited them and heard about their awareness of evacuation and their evacuation behavior during the flood. The total respondents were 301 households. Approximately 100 households from totally or seriously destroyed houses lived outside of the study area during the survey. The respondents living outside totaled only 33 households because some households' present address was unknown or had moved far from the study areas. Therefore, the rate of respondents who suffered from serious damage is slightly low. The summary of the questionnaire survey is shown in Table 1 . Time series of flood risk awareness and evacuation rate are shown in Figure 2 . Here, flood risk awareness has three stages. The first stage is whether the household thought about the flood, the second stage is whether the household was sure about the flood, and the third stage is whether the household decided to evacuate. The number of households who thought or were sure about the flood or decided to evacuate increased beginning at 6:00 A.M. The evacuation rate also increased at 6:00 A.M. Since the flood occurred early in the morning, many households were already flooded when they woke up. Then, many households were sure about the flood and decided to evacuate at the same time.
We can also confirm this fact from their recognition of neighbors' conditions before thinking about the flood on that day shown in Figure 3 . More than half of respondents in both areas answered that they could not understand their neighbourhood social conditions. They did not have enough time to check them and were forced to decide an evacuation. By 9:00 A.M., 60% of respondents decided to evacuate, but only 40% actually evacuated.; the remaining 20% who decided to evacuate but were unable to do so. They then took refuge in the house and were rescued by the helicopters and the boats. Although we did the questionnaire survey in the afflicted areas, 30% of respondents did not try to evacuate. Some respondents among them did not experience damage from the 1990 flood and thought that this flood would not cause much damage since the levees had been raised.
EVACUATION BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION
The decision-making process of the household who did not evacuate is different from the process of the household which decided to evacuate, but both of them could not evacuate during the flood. We wanted to pay attention to the fact that 40% of the households could evacuate. Then, we treated both as if they were households who did not evacuate. Therefore, we divided the samples into two groups, one is the sample of the evacuated household and another is the sample of the not-evacuated household. We tested whether there was a difference between the two groups' acquisition conditions of the information about the flood disaster, evacuation, etc. The acquisition rates of the information by the means are shown in Table 2 . The results of the t-test of difference between the two rates are also shown in the last column in Table 2 .
The number of households themselves is the largest in a check on the river condition. The difference between the two rates of a check on the river condition by households themselves is statistically other hand, the difference between the two rates of checking the weather conditions by themselves is not statistically significant. This is caused by no rain 1:00 2:00 3:00 4:00 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 at a time before and after the occurrence of the flood. For checking the weather conditions by television and radio, the rate of the not-evacuated household is significantly larger. They did not notice conditions outside of the house due to watching television. They also did not recognize their own risk due to receiving a lot of information about the disaster risk. All of the differences between the two rates about an evacuation order are not statistically significant because an evacuation order was delayed by the local government. There were few households who were advised by someone to evacuate-only 36% in all. However, when households were advised to evacuate from their neighbors and fire volunteers, the rate of evacuation was significantly larger. It seems that the advice to evacuate promoted evacuation as the leading evacuee was regarded as important on an autonomous evacuation.
As stated previously, the evacuated households used checking the river conditions by themselves and the advice of neighbors to make their decision to leave. Time series of the evacuation rate in terms of checking the river conditions and the advice of neighbors are shown in Figure 4 . The final numbers of those who evacuated show that checking the river conditions by themselves was twice the rate of the not-checked household. The evacuation rate was also changed by whether or not the household was advised to evacuate. The average evacuation starting time of the checked household and the household advised to evacuate were 7:47 A.M. and 7:39 A.M., respectively. These groups began to evacuate 10 minutes earlier than the not-checked households and 18 minutes earlier than the notadvised households. The household that acquired this information tended to begin evacuating earlier.
Next, we tested which item among awareness of the Shira River flood, preparedness conditions of disaster, and relationship conditions with local community affected the evacuation behavior. The scoring means of each item of the questionnaire is shown in Table 3 . An awareness of the Shira River flood is scored to be higher as thinking the probability of flood to be high. For preparedness conditions of disaster, the score of prepared item is 1 and not is 0. For relationship with the local community, each item is scored to be higher as closely relating. The mean of each item of the evacuated household and the not-evacuated household is shown in Table 4 . The results of the ttest of difference between the two means are also shown in Table 4 . The evacuated household evaluated the probability of flood to be high.
They also prepared the emergency kit and participated in an evacuation drill about the preparedness of disaster. For relationship with the local community, the evacuated households tended to be familiar and acquainted with their neighbors and participated in activities of community development or community support.
EVACUATION BEHAVIOR MODEL
From the analyses of the foregoing chapter, checking river conditions, advice to evacuate, preparation of an emergency kit, participation in an evacuation drill, familiarity with their neighbors, acquaintance with their neighbors, and participation in activities of community development or community support are given as the factors that affected evacuation behavior. It seems that the characteristics of each area also affected evacuation behavior. Thus, Tatsudajinnai-4chome is 1, and Tatsuda-1chome is 0 as the area dummy variable. Four levels of forecasted depth of the flood in Figure  1 are also treated as a variable from 1 to 4. The evacuation behavior model which decides whether or not each household in the study area will evacuate is estimated as possible explanatory variables which are the above variables. The estimated parameters are shown in Table 5 .
For factors relating each household, the variables for checking the river conditions and advice to evacuate are significant statistically. For the characteristics of each area, the variable of forecasted depth of the flood is significant statistically, but the area dummy variable satisfies only 10% significance. However, the area dummy variable is left as an explanatory variable from a viewpoint of area identification.
Since the parameter of an area dummy variable is negative, the households in Tatsuda-1chome have a marked tendency to evacuate. All respondents in Tatsudajinnai-4chome live in a single-family house, while some respondents in Tatsuda-1chome live on the second floor or the third floor in an apartment house and they did not evacuate at that time. This is a reason of the above. The parameters of the forecasted depth of the flood on the hazard map, a check on the river conditions and advice of evacuation are positive, and the assumed conditions of these parameters are satisfied. Num. of sample 260 ** 1 % level of significance, * 5% level of significance The evacuation rate during the flood on July 12, 2012, was calculated from the simulation by the evacuation behavior model to check the reproducibility of it. The results are shown in Figure 5 with the real rate from the questionnaire survey. The calculated rate of Tatsudajinnai-4chome is a little larger than the real rate, but the calculated rate can approximate the real rate on the entire area doing well. We tested how much the evacuation rate would be improved if all households check the river conditions and/or are advised to evacuate. First, we estimated the evacuation rate if all of the households checked the river conditions. The rate increased by 10% throughout the whole area. Next, we estimated the rate if all households were advised to evacuate. It also increased by 10% throughout whole area. The rate of Tatsudajinnai-4chome was improved remarkably because many households in Tatsudajinnai-4chome were not advised to evacuate during this flood. Lastly, we estimated the rate if all households checked the river conditions and were advised to evacuate. In this case, 80% of the households in Tatsudajinnai-4chome and 58% of the households in Tatsuda-1chome would have evacuated. Therefore, it is made clear that the evacuation rate would have been 1.4 times larger than the real rate if all of the households would have checked the river conditions and were advised to evacuate. Since, in reality, it is dangerous to check the river conditions directly, it is desirable that the river conditions would be checked through the camera.
EVACUATION BEHAVIOR AND COMMUNITY
In the previous section, it was stated that that it is important to promote evacuation to advise to evacuate. Next, we will analyze the relationships the households who were advised to evacuate have with the local community. We divided the samples into two groups: one is the sample of the households who were advised to evacuate and the other is the sample of those who were not advised. Then, we calculated the mean of each item for the relationship with local community by group. The means and t-test results of the difference between the two groups' means are shown in Table 6 . It is indicated that mostly, the means of the households advised to evacuate were larger. The households advised to evacuate know their neighbors well and are a good mixer in their neighborhood. They tend to have a lot of friends who hear their complaints and worries. They also tend to participate in community learning and activities of community development or community support. With this, the households forming proper human relationships with their neighbors were advised to evacuate.
It is made clear that advice to evacuate is useful in promoting evacuation, and the households advised to evacuate are close with their local community. Although the households in Tatsudajinnai-4chome and Tatsuda-1chome suffered almost the same damage from this flood, a lot of households in Tatsudajinnai-4chome failed to evacuate and were rescued by helicopters and boats. We tested whether the usual activity level of local community relates to evacuation behaviors during a disaster. We calculated the mean of each item regarding preparedness for a disaster and relationship with community by area. The means and t-test results of the difference between two areas' means are shown in Table 7 .
Focusing on the items of preparedness for a disaster, the means of evacuation drill and fire volunteer in Tatsuda-1chome are larger. For the items regarding relationship with local community, the means of complaint or worries and residents' association in Tatsudajinnai-4chome are larger. Most of the households in Tatsudajinnai-4chome live in a single-family house, while 10% of the households in Tatsuda-1chome live in an apartment. The households living in an apartment usually demonstrate a low rate of participation in residents' associations, which affected the results. The means of frequency of greeting, prevention activities of crime and fire, and activities of community development or community support in Tatsuda1chome are larger. From these analyses, we assume that the usual activities of local communities involve the emergency activities which are advice to evacuate and leading the evacuation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study, we surveyed the evacuation behavior during the flood on July 12, 2012, in Tatsuda areas which suffered serious damage. Then, the factors of promoting an autonomous evacuation were analyzed. It is indicated that the factors that affected evacuation behavior in Tatsuda areas were checking the river conditions, advice to evacuate, preparation of an emergency kit, participation in an evacuation drill, familiarity with neighbors, acquaintance with neighbors, and participation in activities of community development or community support, from statistical point of view. The evacuation behavior model deciding whether or not each household evacuated was estimated as these factors considered the explanatory variable candidates. Consequently, the variables for checking the river conditions and advice to evacuate were selected as the explanatory variables promoting an autonomous evacuation. The evacuation behaviours during the flood were simulated by using the estimated model, and the evacuation rates were forecasted under the three scenarios. It is made clear that the evacuation rate will be 1.4 times larger than the real rate from the questionnaire survey if all of the households can check the river conditions and can be advised to evacuate. The usual activities of local communities lead the emergency activities which are advice to evacuate and the leading the evacuation. These results prove what the past research indicated-that the level of relationship between each household and the local community and the activity level of the local community affect their awareness level of disaster prevention.
Both activation of common activities in local community and mutual acknowledgment among the neighboring households are indispensable for promoting an evacuation in an entire area by advice to evacuate during a disaster. On the other hand, from the evacuation behavior simulation, even if the households check the river conditions and are advised to evacuate, 35% of the households will not evacuate. It suggests the need for disaster risk communication which makes households living in the dangerous area recognize a disaster risk. It is rediscovered that daily practice of common activities in the local area is the key to constructing the disaster mitigation type society.
